The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

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THE REMEDIAL AUTHORITY OF HEARING AND REVIEW OFFICERS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

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INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a funding act that dates back to 1975. The primary purpose of the IDEA is to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to each child with a disability. The vehicle for determining and delivering FAPE is an individualized education program (IEP).

The cornerstone for resolving disputes between parents and districts as to eligibility, FAPE, and other issues under the IDEA, is an impartial administrative adjudication conducted by a hearing/review officer (H/RO).

The IDEA gives states the choice of having a one-tiered system, consisting solely of an impartial due process hearing, or a two-tiered system, which includes an additional officer level review. Subsequent to exhausting this administrative adjudication, the aggrieved party has the right to judicial review in state or federal court. The IDEA accords judges the authority to award attorneys’ fees in specified circumstances and, without further specification, requires them to grant “such relief as the court determines is

1. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000). The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was originally named the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (the Act). § 1400(c)(2). Congress reauthorized the Act several times, with successive refinements. The 1990 reauthorization included the name change to the IDEA. For a comprehensive comparison of the 1986 reauthorization, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, see Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 178 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 629 (2003). The implementing regulations for the IDEA are at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2005). The most recent reauthorization, signed by President Bush on December 3, 2004, went into effect, in relevant part, on July 1, 2005. With limited exceptions, see infra note 10, the reauthorization did not materially change the statutory provisions that provide the basis for the analysis in this Article.

2. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (setting forth six purposes of the IDEA). A free appropriate public education (FAPE) consists of special education and related services designed to address the needs of the individual eligible child. § 1401(8); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (2005) (specifying that FAPE means services that “[i]nclude preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education”).

3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1410(11), 1414(d); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16, 300.347 (2005) (defining an individualized educational program (IEP) team and delineating the content of an IEP).

4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (providing the procedures for instituting an impartial due process hearing). The other dispute resolution mechanism, which is purely administrative and without judicial review, is the state complaint resolution process. §§ 300.660-662. Mediation is also available as an adjunct to the hearing/review officer process. § 300.506.

5. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(4); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510, .512 (indicating situations in which appeal or civil action may be available). Currently, approximately 17 states have a second, review-officer tier, with the remaining 34 states opting for a one-tier, state-level hearing officer system. Eileen Ahearn, Due Process Hearings: 2001 Update, QUICK TURN AROUND (Project Forum at Nat’l Ass’n of State Directors of Special Educ., Alexandria, VA), Apr. 2002, at 2.

6. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a) (stating that a party may bring a claim in a “district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy”).

7. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (requiring that the fees be reasonable).
appropriate. The IDEA and its regulations, however, are largely silent about the remedial authority of the impartial H/ROs.

In the expansive litigation under the IDEA, courts have exercised various traditional forms of relief, primarily in the form of the injunction-based, specialized equitable remedies of tuition reimbursement and compensatory education. In contrast, the courts are divided as to whether the IDEA, with or without § 1983, allows for the legal remedy of money

8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(b)(3).
9. In contrast to the silence regarding hearing/review officers (H/ROs), the regulations explicitly provide the state complaint process, which is the alternate administrative dispute resolution mechanism, and express remedies, including expense reimbursement and compensatory education. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.600(b)(1), 662(c).
10. There are limited exceptions. The first is an injunction, analogous to the judicial authority construed in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988), to change the placement of the child on an interim basis in narrowly specified, danger-based disciplinary circumstances. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2). Based on additional language in the regulations in terms of the district proposing the interim placement, 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(d), the hearing officer’s authority is arguably only declaratory, rather than injunctive, relief. The 2004 IDEA reauthorization deleted the criteria for such interim placements, suggesting that the hearing officer may not be limited to the district proposal. Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 615(k)(3)(B)(ii), 118 Stat. 2703 (2004) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(B)(ii)); see also § 615(k)(2). A second limited exception is the declaratory or injunctive authority, unless inconsistent with state law, to override a refusal of parental consent to an initial evaluation or re-evaluation. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(b). With regard to initial services, however, the 2004 IDEA reauthorization codified the administering agency’s interpretation that hearing officers lack such overriding authority for parental refusals of consent. Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 614(a)(1)(D)(ii), 118 Stat. 2703 (2004) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)); see also Letter to Manasevit, 41 IDELR ¶ 36, at 201 (OSEP 2003); Letter to Gagliardi, 36 IDELR ¶ 267, at 1161 (OSERS 2001); Letter to Cox, 36 IDELR ¶ 66, at 282 (OSEP 2001) (noting that the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) interpreted the IDEA as permitting the overriding of parental refusal only with regard to evaluations). Third, the IDEA specifically grants not only judges, but also hearing officers the authority to issue tuition reimbursement; however, in odd partial contradiction, the IDEA limits the equitable step to “a judicial finding of unreasonableness.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (emphasis added); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.403(c), .403(d)(3) (implementing the reimbursement limitation). Finally, in limiting the hearing officer’s authority to find a denial of FAPE on circumscribed, basically prejudicial procedural violations, the 2004 IDEA reauthorization expressly recognized a hearing officer’s authority to order a district to comply with the Act’s pertinent procedural requirements. Pub. L. No. § 615(f)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii), 118 Stat. at 2722-23 (2004) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(e)(E)).

14. See infra note 144 (explaining that the appropriate avenue to enforce an H/RO order is in court via a § 1983 action). For related articles, see, for example, Terry Jean Seligmann, A Dollar, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L.
delineated as the boundaries for H/ROs’ remedial authority? But what have the courts and other sources of legal authority delineated as the boundaries for H/ROs’ remedial authority?

The purpose of this Article is to demarcate the extent of H/ROs’ remedial authority under the IDEA and correlative state special education laws. The sources for this synthesis are pertinent court decisions, published H/RO decisions, and interpretations of the Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) to date. The

15. Compare Ortega v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the availability of tort-like relief under IDEA as inconsistent with its purpose as a social-welfare mechanism to provide appropriate educational services), Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 40 IDELR ¶ 90, at 377 (1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting the availability of compensatory damages under an emotional distress claim in the absence of tort-like monetary damages under IDEA or punitive damages under § 504 or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)), Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing the situation in which awarding money damages is the only way to compensate for the grievance from the situation in which the injured party failed to timely pursue effective remedies), Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (opining that, even if damages are available under the IDEA, they should be awarded in a judicial forum and not in an administrative hearing), Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998) (denying compensatory damages because neither general nor punitive damages are available under the IDEA), Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that compensatory and punitive damages should be awarded because the violation of IDEA amounted to educational malpractice), and Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting money damages as inconsistent with the IDEA’s structure of elaborate provision for educational services), with W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (permitting recovery of money damages under a federal civil rights statute for violation of the IDEA and Rehabilitation Act), Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 248 F. Supp. 2d 936, 939 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (deducing congressional intent to provide a plaintiff with recovery under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA), Zearley v. Ackerman, 116 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.D.C. 2000) (joining the Third Circuit’s position that there is an implied right of action for monetary damages for § 1983 claims premised on IDEA violations), and L.C. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Utah 1999) (granting money damages under the IDEA, as well as under § 1983, for violation of due process rights provided under the IDEA). The case law is limited and similarly split with regard to punitive damages. Compare T.B. v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR ¶ 67, at 265 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (analogizing the funding conditions of the IDEA to a contract and noting that punitive damages are not available in breach of contract cases), and Appleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Benson, 32 IDELR ¶ 91, at 284 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (finding that punitive damages are not available under IDEA), with Irene B. v. Phila. Acad. Charter Sch., 38 IDELR ¶ 183, at 738 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (allowing a claim for punitive damages against an individual), and Woods v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 796 F. Supp. 767, 776 (D.N.J. 1992) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) and citing Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)) (holding that the IDEA authorized punitive damages, based on the language that the court may “grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate”).

16. The scope of this Article does not extend to the remedial authority of H/ROs under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. For one of the rare examples of applicable authority, see Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 38 IDELR ¶ 235, at 941 (N.M. SEA 2002).

17. The primary publication for H/RO decisions (designated in the citations as “SEA” inasmuch as the state education agency is responsible for the H/RO system) and Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) interpretations is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR) and its predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Law Report (EHLR). The representativeness of the IDELR’s sampling of H/RO decisions is subject to question. See Anastasia D’Angelo, Gary Lutz & Perry A. Zirkel, Are Published IDEA Hearing Officer Decisions Representative?, 14 J.
boundaries of this Article, however, do not extend to the related issues of the deferral accorded to 18 or by 19 H/ROs under the IDEA; H/ROs’ impartiality 20 or, to the extent that it does not directly intertwine with remedial authority, 21 H/ROs’ jurisdiction 22 under the IDEA; the statute of limitations for filing for a first- or second-tier administrative proceeding under the IDEA; 23 or hearing officers’ remedial authority under § 504. 24 Moreover, the boundaries of this Article are limited to the scope of the H/ROs’ remedial authority, not to the standards they use to reach remedies. 25 Finally, this Article only addresses H/ROs’ remedial authority as a result of, not during, 26 the prehearing and hearing process.

To a large extent, the pertinent legal authorities treat the remedial authority of H/ROs as derived from and largely commensurate with the remedial authority of the courts. 27 The following Parts of this Article


18. See James Newcomb & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of the Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 469 (1999) (tracking court cases concerning special education disputes under the administrative and judicial venues).


24. To date, there is negligible authority specific to this subject. For a comprehensive source that includes hearing officer decisions under § 504, see PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504, THE ADA, AND THE SCHOOLS (2d ed. 2000).

25. For sources that do explore these issues, see Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 12; Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education Services Under the IDEA: An Annotated Update, 190 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 745 (2004).

26. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.509(b)(2) (2005) (enforcing a five-day rule for evidence); § 300.502(d) (ordering an independent educational evaluation “as part of the hearing”); S.F. ex rel. S.F. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, 783 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (concerning authority to order discovery).

delineate the specific boundaries of this derived remedial authority in special education cases with respect to each of the major categories of relief—declaratory, injunctive, and monetary—in this order of approximately ascending strength. When the applicable source—court, H/RO, or OSEP—addresses multiple forms of relief, I categorize the decision as the strongest relief except when there is separate treatment of each remedy.

I. H/RO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE DECLARATORY RELIEF

It is undisputed that an H/RO has authority to determine (1) whether a student is covered under one or more of the eligibility classifications of the IDEA, 28 (2) whether a district’s evaluation and/or the parents’ independent educational evaluation (IEE) is appropriate, 29 and (3) whether a student’s program and placement are appropriate. 30 Thus far, the legal limitations on an H/RO’s authority to issue declaratory relief with respect to these questions have been scant. Courts have, however, restricted H/ROs’ authority to issue declaratory relief with respect to the following issues.

First, a federal district court in the District of Columbia appears to have limited an H/RO’s ability to address a parent’s proposed placement when the child is still in the district’s placement, as distinguished from a tuition reimbursement case in which the parent has unilaterally placed their child in a private placement. Specifically, in Davis v. District of Columbia Board of Education, the court ruled that when the child is still in the district’s placement, hearing officers do not have the authority to issue declaratory relief, much less injunctive relief specific to the appropriateness of the parent’s proposed alternative placement. 31 According to this court, in said context, an H/RO is limited to declaring whether the placement that the district has offered is appropriate. 32 If the H/RO’s determination is that said placement is inappropriate, the Davis interpretation requires the hearing officer to remand the issue to the IEP team to develop an appropriate placement. 33 In rejecting the plaintiff-parent’s reliance on an

28. 34 C.F.R § 300.507(a)(1). For the eligibility classifications, see § 300.7.
29. § 300.507(a)(1). For the evaluation, reevaluation, and independent educational evaluation (IEE) regulations detailing specifics on an H/RO’s authority regarding IEEs, see §§ 300.502(a)(1), .320, .321, infra note 51.
30. § 300.507(a)(1). For the FAPE and placement regulations, see §§ 300.13, .551. On occasion, the H/RO waffles on the yes-no issue of appropriateness. See Lampeter Strasburg Sch. Dist., 43 IDELR ¶ 17, at 58 (Pa. SEA 2005) (“[T]he IEP is appropriate for what it is . . . . But it is wholly lacking . . . . It is not necessarily inappropriate, but it is only marginally appropriate.”).
32. Id. at 1211.
33. The court added that the hearing officer “may, and indeed, should” make a recommendation for an appropriate program or placement. Id. at 1212.
OSEP policy letter that adopted a contrary interpretation, however, the court relied on a consent decree that is specific to the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{35}

Perhaps due to the early date\textsuperscript{36} and the limiting legal context\textsuperscript{37} of \textit{Davis}, most H/ROs—and courts—have ignored the \textit{Davis} ruling. Rather, most H/ROs have routinely considered the appropriateness of a parental proposal in which the H/ROs declare that the district’s placement is inappropriate.\textsuperscript{39}

A second and more generally accepted limitation is that H/ROs typically decline to declare which side is the prevailing party,\textsuperscript{40} except where state law requires H/ROs to include this determination for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees.\textsuperscript{41} One example of such a jurisdiction is California, which
requires the hearing officer to make this explicit determination on an issue-by-issue basis. 42

The third limitation is more indirect and generic in terms of whether an H/RO may use declaratory or other relief to decide an issue sua sponte. In the only published decision on point, Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate court answered this question in the negative. 43 The limited exception, according to that court’s interpretation of the IDEA’s administering agency, is that an H/RO has the authority to decide the child’s pendent, or “stay-put,” placement under the IDEA, 44 without either party raising the issue, which in this context amounts to declaratory relief. 45 Yet, on occasion, H/ROs exercise such authority without clear consideration of this boundary and its exception. For example, a review officer in New York decided that a plaintiff-child was not eligible for special education even though the parties had stipulated at the hearing that the child was eligible and, thus, it was not an issue on appeal to the review officer. 46

II. H/RO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Although there is no bright line distinction between declaratory and injunctive relief in this context, 47 the boundaries of H/ROs’ injunctive authority have been the subject of more extensive debate than the boundaries of H/ROs’ declaratory relief. As a threshold matter, the Pennsylvania courts have applied the same relatively relaxed sua sponte limitation, which these courts established for declaratory relief, to H/ROs’ injunctive authority. 48 Other jurisdictions have applied this same

42. See Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 201, at 890 (Cal. SEA 2001) (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56507(d)).
45. Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303, 304 (OSEP 1997).
47. Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303, 304 (OSEP 1997).
49. H/ROs in some jurisdictions—for example, Pennsylvania—use the term “order” generically as the caption for the remedies section of their written opinions. As another example of the blurred boundary, an H/RO’s declaratory determination that the district’s or the parent’s proposed program or placement is appropriate in effect amounts to an order to effectuate said program or placement. For more of these forms of relief, see supra note 10.
limitation with similar latitude. The rest of this Part organizes the applicable rulings in terms of the subject of the injunctive relief, ranging from evaluations to attorneys’ fees.

A. Ordering Evaluations

First, the IDEA expressly provides H/ROs with the authority to override lack of parental consent for initial evaluations and reevaluations except where disallowed by state law. There are many examples of such H/RO orders, which can also be seen as declaratory relief. A Pennsylvania court decision demarcates two applicable boundaries to H/ROs’ injunctive authority with regard to evaluations. This decision, though not officially published, concerns gifted students under state law. Nevertheless, it is available in Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR), and Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate court has treated its gifted students cases without notable distinction from its IDEA cases. First, relying on its aforementioned decision with regard to declaratory relief under the IDEA, this Pennsylvania court invalidated the H/RO’s order for the district to conduct a reevaluation because neither


51. Id.; see supra note 10. The only other pertinent express authorization is for ordering an IEE, but that authorization applies during the hearing. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Conrad Weiser Area Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 100, 102 (Pa. SEA 1997). For a review officer decision that interpreted the H/RO’s injunctive authority for an IEE during the hearing not to be subject to a sua sponte limitation, see Board of Education of Hyde Park Central School District, 29 IDELR 658, 662 (N.Y. SEA 1998).

52. See, e.g., Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 1069, 1069 (Pa. SEA 1995); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 286, at 1240 (Tex. SEA 2002); Cayuga Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 815, 816 (Tex. SEA 1995) (permitting school districts to request an order overriding parental lack of consent).


party had raised this issue. Second, the Pennsylvania court alternatively reasoned that the review officer panel erred as a matter of law in ordering a reevaluation because the court had concluded that the district’s reevaluation was appropriate.

B. Overriding Refusal of Parental Consent for Services

Prior to the most recent reauthorization of the IDEA, H/ROs’ authority to override a refusal of parental consent and thus effectively order the provision of special education services to the child was subject to controversy. Congress has made clear, however, that H/ROs and courts do not have such authority with regard to initial placement.

C. Ordering IEP Revisions

It is not unusual for an H/RO to order revisions in a child’s IEP. When the basis for a revision order was a defensible determination that the IEP was inappropriate, such relief arguably is within an H/RO’s discretion, unless the relief is deemed to preempt the IEP team’s responsibility.
However, a decision by Florida’s intermediate appellate court invalidated an H/RO’s order for a district to add specified services to the IEP that were at issue when there was no such determination.\(^\text{62}\) Reasoning that the H/RO had concluded that the IEP was appropriate, the court ruled that the order to add services to the IEP was beyond the H/RO’s authority.\(^\text{63}\) An added problem with orders to revise the IEP in cases where the H/RO deems the placement or program appropriate is that such orders may well trigger the issue of the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision.\(^\text{64}\) Yet, H/ROs sometimes order such revisions, presumably ignorant of such limitations.\(^\text{65}\)

**D. Ordering a Particular Student Placement**

Reflecting the overlap between declaratory and injunctive relief, the foregoing discussion about the boundaries for H/ROs’ authority to declare in favor of a particular placement also applies to their authority to order such a placement.\(^\text{66}\)

**E. Awarding Tuition Reimbursement**

Whether viewed as tied to program or placement, the two forms of relief most specifically associated with the IDEA are tuition reimbursement and compensatory education services.

Tuition reimbursement, used generically to refer to reimbursement for various expenses in addition to or alternative to tuition, such as transportation and other related services, is a well-established remedy

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\(^{63}\) Citing a previous Davis-based decision, the court referred to sua sponte grounds, but its rationale can also be seen as functus officio, that is, that, by resolving the issue of appropriateness, the H/RO lacked authority to order any relief. \(\text{Id. at 1074-75}\).

\(^{64}\) See, e.g., Linda T. ex rel. William A. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist., 417 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that parent was not the prevailing party for purpose of attorneys’ fees where the ordered revisions were de minimis in comparison to the primary issue of placement, which the district won).

\(^{65}\) For examples of instances in which H/ROs ignored limitations on their authority to add services to the IEP, see Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 22 IDELR 931 (Ala. SEA 1995); Ipswich Pub. Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR ¶ 113, at 556 (Mass. SEA 2005); W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 42 IDELR ¶ 22, at 95 (Mass. SEA 2004); Portland Sch. Dep’t, 21 IDELR 1209 (Me. SEA 1995); Worcester Pub. Sch., 43 IDELR ¶ 213, at 986 (Mass. SEA 2005); Bd. of Educ. of Portage Pub. Sch., 25 IDELR 372 (Mich. SEA 1996); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the New York, 21 IDELR 472 (N.Y. SEA 1994); Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 825 (Pa. SEA 1994); Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 1193 (Pa. SEA 1994); Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 878 (Pa. SEA 1994); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 208 (Tex. SEA 1994); Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 482 (Tex. SEA 1994); Granite Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR 405 (Utah SEA 1995); Loudon County Pub. Sch., 22 IDELR 833 (Va. SEA 1995). For an unusual example of the obverse, an Illinois hearing officer included in her orders, upon upholding the appropriateness of the district’s proposed placement that, “if the guardian chooses to ‘home school’ this child, it shall be considered as a truancy and reported to appropriate authorities as such.” Bd. of Educ. of Harlem Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 122, 44 IDELR ¶ 18, at 75 (Ill. SEA 2005). The exception is for the limited circumstance of hearing officer Honig-type injunctions. See supra note 10.

\(^{66}\) See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
under the IDEA. In a pair of decisions, the Supreme Court established what most authorities view as a three-part test: (1) whether the district’s proposed placement is appropriate; (2) if not, whether the parents’ unilateral placement is appropriate; and (3) if so, equitable considerations. In establishing this set of criteria, the Court made clear that it based this tuition reimbursement remedy on the IDEA authorization for appropriate judicial relief and that said relief was distinguishable from money damages. In its subsequent codification of this case law via the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress made clear that the authority to award tuition reimbursement extends to H/ROs.

Before and after the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, H/ROs have routinely applied the relevant three-part test without any other particular boundary. In the only notable—but temporary—judicial limitation, the Third Circuit—in a case that arose before the 1997 amendments—negated an H/RO’s equitable reduction of the reimbursement amount. The court declared that unreasonable parental conduct was not a relevant factor, but the court acknowledged that Congress had included it in the applicable calculus for cases arising after 1997.

Another published decision that demarcated a specifically pertinent limitation on tuition reimbursement as a remedy was a review officer decision under the IDEA jurisdiction of the Department of Defense Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS). More specifically, the review officer ruled that (1) hearing officers’ remedial

68. E.g., Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 12, at 351.
69. Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 369. Although the Court focused on judicial remedial authority, other sources interpreted the authority as extending to H/ROs. See, e.g., Letter to Van Buiten, EHLR 211:429A (OSEP 1987) (citing S-1 v. Spangler, 650 F. Supp. 1427 (M.D.N.C. 1986)).
70. Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 370-71 (“Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance . . . .”)
71. This codification arguably preserves the uncodified residuum of Burlington-Carter. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 12,603 (Mar. 12, 1999); cf. M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2005); Justin G. v. Bd. of Educ., 148 F. Supp. 2d 576, 587 (D. Md. 2001) (stating that the school district’s policy prohibiting children never enrolled in public schools from receiving tuition reimbursement was an absurd interpretation of the relevant state statute). But see Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004); Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. Taylorch, 395 F. Supp. 2d 246 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that, in order to be considered for tuition reimbursement, parents must at least give the public school advance notice before they place their children in a private school).
73. See, e.g., Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 12.
74. Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 86 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1999).
75. Id.
orders are entitled to the general rebuttable presumption of good faith deference, and (2) the reimbursable expenses must be reasonable and do not include the “normal expenses of raising a child.” The case was the subject of multiple judicial appeals, but these appeals focused on other issues.

Representing even more limiting authority, a hearing officer in Kansas ruled that tuition reimbursement was not available for a gifted student based on a district’s failure to implement the student’s IEP. The hearing officer’s reasoning and invocation of cited authorities were not clear or cogent, but the decision is not necessarily limited to gifted students because Kansas’s special education law is the same, in relevant part, for students with disabilities.

F. Awarding Compensatory Education

Compensatory education, like tuition reimbursement, is a specialized form of injunctive remedy. The courts have established compensatory education as an available equitable remedy under the IDEA via an analogy, albeit an incomplete one, to tuition reimbursement. Although the Third Circuit initially commented, by way of dicta, that H/ROs do not have the authority to award compensatory education, the IDEA administering

76. In re Student with a Disability, 30 IDELR 408, 416-18 (DDESS 1998). The review officer also reversed the hearing officer’s decision with regard to other injunctive relief, which is separately addressed infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
79. For example, the hearing officer refers to various forms of hostility, but a failure to provide FAPE, whether as a matter of formulation or implementation, certainly suffices for the primary step of the Burlington-Carter analysis. Similarly, the hearing officer makes the analogy to punitive damages, but the cited authority, which are IDEA cases, merely distinguish tuition reimbursement from money damages.
81. One distinction is that tuition reimbursement requires the parents to prove the appropriateness of their chosen program. Another is that tuition reimbursement, except for the equitable limitations, is essentially an all-or-nothing choice, whereas compensatory education is amenable to careful tailoring. Thus far, neither the courts nor H/ROs have recognized these distinctions in their analyses. To the contrary, the Third Circuit’s differential treatment, to whatever extent that it remains differential, lacks an explicit rationale. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. M.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996). For a suggested approach that is defensibly consistent, see Zirkel, supra note 13.
82. See, e.g., Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Congress gave courts the power to grant a compensatory remedy).
83. Lester H., 916 F.2d at 869.
agency and the courts have established that H/ROs do have such authority under the IDEA. Previous sources have comprehensively canvassed the standards for, and other issues specific to, the award of compensatory education.

Given the focus here on the scope of H/RO remedial authority, it suffices to identify the following possible, but unsettled, boundaries for the courts and, by inference, H/ROs with regard to compensatory education awards (1) after graduation, (2) during stay-put after age 21, (3) concurrent with tuition reimbursement, and (4) for postsecondary education. More settled is the limitation that the award may not be either open-ended or in excess of “what is required for compliance with the student’s IEP.” Similarly settled, and as would apply to any injunctive relief, an H/RO’s compensatory education order must not be either sua sponte, or so vague as to be unenforceable. Finally, H/ROs have differed widely, but courts have not yet addressed various other scope issues, such as whether an issue 84.

84. See, e.g., Letter to Anonymous, 21 IDELR 1061 (OSEP 1994) (advising that a SEA and a hearing officer may require compensatory education); Letter to Kohn, 17 EHRL 522 (OSEP 1991).

86. For a curious decision in which the court avoided the issue but evidenced obvious confusion as to the difference between compensatory education and a prospective placement order, see Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860 (D.N.H. 1992).

88. Each is subject to split and relatively limited authority.
89. See Zirkel, supra note 13, at 746 n.30.
90. Id. at 748 n.17. In contrast, the availability of compensatory education after age 21 for violations before age 21 is relatively settled. Id. at 748 n.16.
91. Id. at 755 nn.67-68.
92. Id. at 754 n.66.
94. See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Karla B., 26 IDELR 827 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (granting a motion for summary judgment because the issue of compensatory education was withdrawn from the hearing officer’s consideration). Yet, H/ROs continue to transgress this limit, even on occasion in Pennsylvania. See Lampeter Strasburg School District, 43 IDELR ¶ 17, at 51 (Pa. SEA 2005); In re Student with a Disability, 42 IDELR ¶ 224, at 1195 (Pa. SEA 2005) (providing the most recent examples).
95. See Zirkel, supra note 13, at 756 n.78 (noting that vague awards cause implementation problems).
H/RO may retain jurisdiction for implementation\textsuperscript{96} and, if not, to whom an H/RO should instead delegate the implementation of the award.\textsuperscript{97} Nevertheless, as a general matter courts have agreed that H/ROs have rather wide equitable discretion in their calculus for compensatory education.\textsuperscript{98}

\section*{G. Changing Student Grades or Records}

H/ROs occasionally face an issue of student records, and their decisions are usually knee-jerk disclaimers without careful research or reasoning.\textsuperscript{99} In one of the few pertinent published decisions, a Virginia review officer concluded that H/ROs do not have jurisdiction and thus do not have remedial authority to change the grades of an IDEA student.\textsuperscript{100} The review officer reasoned that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) provides a procedure and forum for addressing such matters,\textsuperscript{101} a rather unconvincing rationale.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 755 n.72.
\textsuperscript{97} Id. at 755 nn.73-75. A related question is whether the H/RO must or may order such implementation via an escrow fund. Id. at 756 n.77. A recent federal appeals court decision ruled that an H/RO may not delegate remedial authority to the IEP team, which includes at least one district employee, in light of the IDEA prohibition that the H/RO may not be a district employee. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The prevailing judicial view, however, even in the D.C. Circuit, is that the IEP team is the appropriate forum for resolving the implementation issues of the compensatory education award. See, e.g., Simms v. District of Columbia, 404 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2005); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D.D.C. 2005); Melvin v. Town of Bolton Sch. Dist., 20 IDELR 1189 (D. Vt. 1993), aff'd mem., 100 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1996); State of Conn. Unified Dist. No. 1 v. State Dep't of Educ., 699 A.2d 1077 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).

\textsuperscript{98} See, e.g., Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that compensatory education is an equitable remedy and only to be awarded when appropriate). However, there is some authority that the basis for calculation must be the student’s changed needs rather than the student’s needs at the time of the denial. See, e.g., Conn. Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep’t of Educ., 699 A.2d 1077, 1090 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (deciding that the compensatory education program, while unorthodox, is appropriate). Moreover, a federal appeals court recently overturned an H/RO’s “cookie cutter” approach, requiring instead a customized calculation qualitatively based on “specific educational deficits resulting from [the child’s] loss of FAPE.” Reid, 401 F.3d at 523, 526; see also Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasizing the need for an inquiry that is “qualitative, fact-intensive, and above all, tailored to the unique needs of the disabled student”); cf. D.H. v. Manheim Township Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR ¶ 38 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (based on “only those needs of the student[] that directly flow from his diagnosed SLD”). In a recent district court decision in the wake of Reid and Branham, the judge expressed a general preference for H/ROs to make this needs-based determination, subject to judicial review. Thomas v. District of Columbia, 407 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005).

\textsuperscript{99} See, e.g., Bourne Pub. Sch., 37 IDELR ¶ 261, at 1144 (Mass. SEA 2002) (denying jurisdiction with the only explanation being, without any cited support, that “[t]his is not a claim for which there is available relief under the IDEA”).

\textsuperscript{100} Fairfax County Pub. Sch., 38 IDELR ¶ 275, at 1097 (Va. SEA 2003).
\textsuperscript{101} 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
\textsuperscript{102} The express provisions in the IDEA for student records and the broad-based scope of the IDEA’s adjudicative dispute resolution mechanism arguably suggest overlapping,
H/ROs’ injunctive authority with regard to student records has similarly been subject to very few published decisions. For example, a hearing panel in Missouri cursorily concluded that it lacked authority to expunge student records. In doing so, the panel relied solely on the fact that it was a panel of limited jurisdiction.

Releasing records is a different remedy from expunging them. In a New Mexico decision, the review officer concluded that H/ROs lack authority under the IDEA to override parents’ refusal to release the child’s medical records. Citing two published H/RO decisions from other states, the review officer relied on the reasoning that such matters were exclusively within the jurisdiction of FERPA, which is not necessarily persuasive. In any event, the review officer also agreed with dicta in the cited decisions and characterized those decisions as “consistently deplor[ing] the refusal of such releases and express[ing] concern over the results of failures to share relevant information with school personnel.”

H. Ordering a Student’s Promotion or Graduation

Not addressing the remedial authority of H/ROs with regard to promotion and graduation, the IDEA’s administering agency offered the adjacent interpretation that, while standards for promotion and retention are a state and local function, “the IDEA does not prevent a State or local education agency from assigning this decisionmaking responsibility to the IEP team.” But in the absence of such state law delegation, increasing authority seems to suggest that H/ROs face limits in ordering such relief.
For example, a Massachusetts hearing officer avoided deciding whether H/ROs lack authority to order promotions, concluding that waiving the district’s summer credit policy was not appropriate for the particular student.\textsuperscript{110} More strongly, Pennsylvania’s intermediate court concluded that the state law’s delegation of graduation authority to school districts preempted an H/RO from accelerating the graduation of a gifted student.\textsuperscript{111} Although the factual circumstances correlate more closely to gifted students than to those with disabilities,\textsuperscript{112} the court did not specifically limit its decision to gifted students.\textsuperscript{113}

Similarly, an H/RO has limited authority to order a school district to allow a child with disabilities to participate in graduation where either the child has not completed graduation requirements\textsuperscript{114} or the denial did not violate applicable special education regulations or the child’s IEP.\textsuperscript{115}

I. Ordering Training of District Personnel

On occasion H/ROs order training of specified school district personnel without examining whether H/ROs have authority to provide such relief.\textsuperscript{116} In one of many examples,\textsuperscript{117} a Connecticut hearing officer ordered that a

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\textsuperscript{110} Boston Pub. Sch., 24 IDELR 985, 988 (Mass. SEA 1996). The hearing officer thus found it unnecessary to determine whether she had “the authority to order credits which would in effect promote” the student. \textit{Id.} at 989 n.4.


\textsuperscript{112} For example, the court observed that the student needed acceleration, while reasoning that it was “counter-intuitive to consider that [the student’s] progress was accelerated by completing fewer credits, albeit faster, than his matriculation peers.” \textit{Id.} at 1079.

\textsuperscript{113} Specifically, the court relied on its IDEA-related \textit{Woodland Hills} decision; see \textit{infra} note 114 for its preemption rationale. \textit{Id.} at 1078. Nevertheless, the court limited the scope of its ruling by expressly not considering the question of whether the state’s review officer panel has “authority to grant credit for pre-high school courses, which could then satisfy the requirements of graduation.” \textit{Id.} at 1079 n.26.


\textsuperscript{115} Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR ¶ 146, at 493-94 (Cal. SEA 2000).

\textsuperscript{116} See, e.g., Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 43 IDELR ¶ 234, at 1095 (Ala. SEA 2005) (ordering training for teachers and administrators on developing IEPs based on individual student needs when the student moves to homebound school from regular school); Portland Pub. Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR ¶ 143, at 743 (Or. SEA 2005) (requiring training for staff involved in implementing an IEP); cf. Sanford Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. L, 34 IDELR ¶ 262, at 972-73 (D. Me. 2001) (identifying that the H/RO ordered training of an additional therapist, but the issue on appeal was the compensatory education part of the order). For an example of an H/RO decision enforcing the limitation on ordering training, see \textit{Cumberland Valley School District}, 42 IDELR ¶ 79, at 374 (Pa. SEA 2004), which found an order of training to be an error of law.

\textsuperscript{117} See San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR ¶ 249, at 1370 (Cal. SEA 2005) (requiring training of specific staff members regarding certain medical conditions and requirements of special education law); Chicago Pub. Sch., 22 IDELR 1008, 1011 (III. SEA 1995) (ordering training regarding students with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder...
student’s IEP be revised to require that all of the student’s teachers receive training as to the student’s disability, behavior intervention plan, and required services and accommodations.\textsuperscript{118} The hearing officer also ordered the training and selection of an aide for the student.\textsuperscript{119}

The limited pertinent court decisions subject such orders to question. Specifically, Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate court has ruled that H/ROs lack the authority to order a district to arrange for training of its employees as a remedy for denial of FAPE because state law delegates staff development to districts.\textsuperscript{120} Although the case arose in the context of state regulations for gifted students, which differ in part from the IDEA,\textsuperscript{121} the court in subsequent remedy related decisions imported this ruling to the IDEA context.\textsuperscript{122} Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania court’s preemption rationale is subject to dispute in cases controlled by the federal IDEA, as compared to state special education laws that are not deemed to be incorporated to federal standards.

\textbf{J. Ordering Districts to Hire Consultants}

On occasion, H/ROs order districts to hire an outside expert as part of the remedy for denial of FAPE.\textsuperscript{123} Yet, H/ROs have not reflected general cognizance of the increasing case law that points to boundaries in issuing such consultant remedies.

In the first case to impose a boundary, a DDESS review officer reversed such an order as “impermissible micro management,” and thus “ultra vires and a clear abuse of discretion.”\textsuperscript{124} Although grounded in the statutory prerogatives of the education agency, the ruling is limited for several reasons: (1) DDESS represents a special context; (2) the hearing officer’s order included various other forms of nonreimbursement relief, which the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 40 IDELR ¶ 223, at 929 (Ct. SEA 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{121} See, e.g., id. at 1075 n.10 (noting the distinction federal law draws between gifted and special education).
\item \textsuperscript{122} See infra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the propriety of an H/RO ordering the hiring of an outside expert).
\item \textsuperscript{124} In re Student with a Disability, 30 IDELR 408, 418 (DDESS 1998).
\end{itemize}
review officer’s opinion covered only cryptically; and (3) the subsequent judicial appeals focused on other issues.  

Second, in dicta in a case concerning the appropriateness of an IEP, the Seventh Circuit commented on a hearing officer’s “extensive relief, including, among other things, the appointment of private consultants who would essentially manage and deliver [the student’s] public education.”  

Regarding this relief as supporting the lower court’s conclusion that the hearing officer did not provide due deference to the school personnel’s IEP judgments, the Seventh Circuit characterized the hearing officer’s remedies as “extreme measures that obviously went beyond remedying [the student’s] situation.” The degree to which this proportionality limitation applied to the ordered consultants is unclear because the court cited another of the hearing officer’s remedies as illustrative of the hearing officer’s overreaching—the order that the district provide disability awareness and sensitivity training for every student in the district.

In the third and most significant development to date, Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate court concluded that an H/RO’s order that a district hire an outside expert to facilitate the development of a new IEP for the plaintiff-student was ultra vires in light of (1) the regulatory delegation of IEP team membership to the school district, (2) the limited scope of the violation, and (3) the regulatory limitations on IEP team composition.

The same court has interchangeably applied this limitation in the gifted student and IDEA contexts, but it left the limitation’s specific scope unclear in the IDEA context, explicitly ruling only that an H/RO lacked authority to order the district to engage outside experts for students with disabilities “without supporting evidence in the record.” Finally, the same Pennsylvania court also applied its sua sponte limitation to invalidate an H/RO order to hire an outside expert.

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126. Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 610 (7th Cir. 2004).
127. Id. at 614.
128. Id.
129. Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert O., 785 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). The court was not clear or convincing with regard to the scope of its rationale. For example, after pointing out that the violation was the district’s ejection of the parents from the IEP team, the court reasoned: “Although the [H/RO] may have the implicit authority to remedy non-compliance with the special education regulations, it does not have the authority to impose requirements in addition to those in the regulations.” Id. at 1078. The conclusion about additional requirements does not seem to square with the court’s recognition that the regulations set minimum, not maximum, requirements for IEP team membership. Id.
Most recently, however, a federal district court in Kentucky upheld a review officer’s order to arrange for the student’s private psychologist to attend the IEP meeting, at district expense, to help the team devise and monitor a plan for providing the student with two years of compensatory education. The court concluded that the requirement of the psychologist’s attendance was equitable in this particular case, inasmuch as the review officer delegated the tailoring of the compensatory education to the team rather than ordering a specific number of hours. The court did not mention the Pennsylvania decisions, probably because the school district’s argument did not extend beyond the requirements of the IDEA to the possible limitations of state law.

K. Issuing Enforcement Orders

H/ROs’ enforcement authority has been tested for two overlapping subjects—private settlements and H/ROs’ prior decisions. Some H/ROs order the enforcement of private settlement agreements, while other H/ROs interpret the courts’ authority as exclusive in this area. There is at least limited judicial support for H/ROs’ authority to enforce private settlement agreements. In the lead case, D.R. v. East Brunswick Board

133. For the related issue of whether H/ROs have the authority to determine whether parties’ private settlement agreements are enforceable, which would fit here under declaratory relief, see Plymouth-Canton Community School v. K.C., 40 IDELR ¶ 178, at 736-37 (E.D. Mich. 2003), in which the court upheld the validity of the agreement and expressed no difficulty with the hearing officer having reached this same conclusion. For the more remotely related matter of whether hearing officers have jurisdiction to resume the hearing process and issue resulting relief after the parties settled the matter during the hearing, see Independent School District No. 432 v. J.H., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Minn. 1998). Finally, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), hearing officers increasingly face the issue of whether they can and should affirm a private settlement agreement. See, e.g., Rockport Pub. Sch., 36 IDELR ¶ 27, at 98-99 (Mass. SEA 2002) (recognizing that a hearing officer has no authority to award attorneys’ fees).
134. See, e.g., Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR ¶ 23, at 60-61 (Tex. SEA 1999) (holding that the petitioners’ only remedy lies in enforcing the settlement agreement).
135. See, e.g., Agawam Pub. Sch., 36 IDELR ¶ 226, at 989-91 (Mass. SEA 2002) (noting that a Third Circuit opinion regarding the enforceability of a settlement agreement is limited to the purview of a “court”). The hearing officer in this case alternatively reasoned that the First Circuit was more likely to follow the dissenting opinion in D.R., which favored the interest in assessing and vindicating individual rights over the interest in a speedy and efficient dispute resolution. The hearing officer cited various supporting First Circuit cases. Id. at 991 n.6 (citing Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990); David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985); Dep’t of Educ. v. Brookline Sch. Comm. 772 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983)).
136. In a decision that tangentially addressed H/RO authority in this area, a federal district court ruled that FAPE, rather than the contempt standard, applies to determine whether either party breached a settlement agreement. E.D. v. Enter. City Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1259 (M.D. Ala. 2003). The connection is that the issue arose, in the court’s description, “where a hearing officer dismisses a request for a due process hearing and issues an order adopting a settlement agreement.” Id.
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of Education, the Third Circuit ruled that such agreements are, as a matter of public policy, enforceable as binding contracts. But the Third Circuit did not address the issue of whether H/ROs have authority to enforce the agreements. More recently, the federal district court in Connecticut relied on the D.R. public policy rationale in ruling that H/ROs have the authority to enforce private settlement agreements. At least one state court has concluded, however, that court-ordered enforcement of such an agreement constitutes a breach of contract claim and therefore falls within judicial jurisdiction.

As a related but separate matter, limited case law suggests that hearing officers have the authority to provide consent decree status to a settlement for purposes of attorneys’ fees, but only upon proper order.

For enforcement of prior H/RO decisions, typically arising when a school district has allegedly failed to implement the prior H/RO’s order, the prevailing view is that the appropriate forums are the state complaint resolution process and, alternatively, the courts, rather than the H/RO process.

L. Issuing Disciplinary Sanctions

The authority of H/ROs to issue disciplinary sanctions against either party or a party’s legal counsel is a controversial question. Pointing out

138. 109 F.3d at 898.
139. Id. at 900.
142. Compare A.R. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (ordering attorneys’ fees because the plaintiff-appellees received court-ordered consent decrees and there was a material alteration of the legal relationship such that they were “prevailing parties” under the IDEA), with Maria C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 43 IDELR ¶ 243, at 1169-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (refusing to order attorneys’ fees because there was no material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties).
143. See, e.g., Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); Newtown Bd. of Educ., 41 IDELR ¶ 201, at 827 (Conn. SEA 2004). However, parents need not exhaust the state’s complaint resolution process before seeking judicial enforcement of an H/RO order. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
144. The prevailing view is that the appropriate, if not exclusive, avenue to enforce an H/RO decision is via a § 1983 action in court. See, e.g., Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996); cf. Reid v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 41 IDELR ¶ 268, at 1138 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (enforcing a compensatory education remedy under settlement agreement through § 1983 action). However, this avenue may be only open to parents, not districts. See, e.g., Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Buskirk, 950 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
145. For the related issue of whether an H/RO has the jurisdiction to reopen the case upon the request of either party for enforcement purposes, see Bd. of Educ. of Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 337 (N.Y. SEA 1998).
that the IDEA requires each state education agency (SEA) to ensure that H/ROs have the authority to grant the relief necessary for dispute resolution, the IDEA’s administering agency has opined that the answer to this question is a matter of state law.\textsuperscript{146} In a Michigan case, a hearing officer ordered parents to pay a district’s costs based on the parents’ counsel’s “unexcusable failure to communicate with the District’s counsel in a timely fashion.”\textsuperscript{147} Questionably assuming that such authority was automatically derivative, the hearing officer cited a case in which a court exercised such authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\textsuperscript{148} In a Texas case, a hearing officer dismissed a case with prejudice, concluding that a parent and the parent’s attorney had engaged in “sanctionable conduct” by filing and dismissing the same special education due process request on four separate occasions as a means to manipulate the hearing settings and abuse the hearing process.\textsuperscript{149} In a recent Ohio case, the state appeals court concluded that H/ROs are entitled to “implied powers similar to those of a court,” but that the review officer’s dismissal of the parents’ case with prejudice, based on their failure to comply with the order to submit the child’s medical and psychological records, was too harsh a sanction.\textsuperscript{150}

The published decisions concerning H/ROs’ authority to order financial sanctions against attorneys are scant and somewhat surprising. In Indiana, which is a two-tier state, a review officer upheld a hearing officer’s authority to issue a financial sanction of $500 for “sham objections” and egregious delays.\textsuperscript{151} While clarifying that the sanction applied to the parents’ attorney, the review officer found the requisite authority in state law.\textsuperscript{152} Citing the Indiana decision, a hearing officer in Minnesota, which is a one-tier state where administrative law judges serve as hearing officers, ordered a parent’s attorney to pay $2,000 to the school district as a disciplinary sanction “for pursuing a [summary judgment] motion without sufficient factual or legal basis.”\textsuperscript{153} The Minnesota hearing officer reasoned that his statutory responsibility to conduct hearings and the state’s equivalent of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly supported his authority to issue sanctions.\textsuperscript{154} Significantly, the federal

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997) (stating that the remedies that H/ROs must have available to them are a matter of state law).
\item \textsuperscript{147} Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Sch., 32 IDELR ¶ 162, at 511 (Mich. SEA 1999).
\item \textsuperscript{148} Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 23 IDELR 1041 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d with reduced amount, 118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997).
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 IDELR ¶ 124, at 553 (Tex. SEA 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{150} Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist., 841 N.E.2d 812,830-31 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
\item \textsuperscript{151} Indianapolis Pub. Sch. 21 IDELR 423, 426 (Ind. SEA 1994).
\item \textsuperscript{152} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Dist. City 1 & Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 IDELR 1081 (Minn. SEA 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{154} Id. at 1086.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
district court in Minnesota subsequently upheld such sanctioning authority when a hearing officer ordered another parent’s attorney to pay $2,432 as a sanction for filing a frivolous fourth hearing request.\textsuperscript{155} The court concluded that the hearing officer’s authority to issue sanctions for frivolous hearing conduct was encompassed within the state regulation that granted hearing officers the authority to “do the additional things necessary to comply” with said regulations.\textsuperscript{156}

In contrast, a review officer in New Mexico recently ruled that under that state’s law, a hearing officer does not even have the authority to recommend that a court sanction noncompliant parents by requiring them to pay the district’s attorneys’ fees.\textsuperscript{157} However, in dicta, the review officer noted that the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, which did not apply in this case, provided courts with the authority to award attorneys’ fees to districts in certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{158} The review officer also commented, rather ambiguously, that “under current law, administrative officers and courts are permitted to take into account Parents’ lack of cooperation with the District in determining whether Parents are entitled to fees should they prevail in a due process proceeding . . . .”\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{M. Issuing Other Injunctive Relief}

H/ROs have issued a rather remarkable range of other injunctions that have not been tested by subsequent review. Examples include (1) an Arkansas hearing officer’s order that a school principal have no further contact with a student;\textsuperscript{160} (2) another Arkansas hearing officer’s order that parents reimburse a district for the cost of an inexcusably cancelled evaluation appointment;\textsuperscript{161} (3) a California hearing officer’s order that parents, who had joint custody but disagreed about their child’s education, obtain a family court ruling as to which parent had final educational decisionmaking authority;\textsuperscript{162} and (4) a Pennsylvania review panel’s decision ordering a district to provide a parent counseling and training.\textsuperscript{163}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{155} Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 32 IDELR ¶ 90, at 283 (D. Minn. 2000).
\bibitem{156} \textit{Id.} at 284.
\bibitem{157} Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 44 IDELR ¶ 205, at 1073 (N.M. SEA 2005).
\bibitem{158} \textit{Id.} at 1070.
\bibitem{159} \textit{Id.} at 1073. The review officer cited the IDEA regulation for attorneys’ fees, which accords courts, not H/ROs, such authority. \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{160} Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR ¶ 288, at 1175 (Ark. SEA 2001). The specific scope of the contact was with regard to discipline.
\bibitem{161} Williford Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 298, at 30 (Ark. SEA 1998).
\bibitem{162} Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR ¶ 53, at 151-52 (Cal. SEA 1999). This remedy was arguably during the hearing and, if so, beyond the scope of this Article.
\end{thebibliography}
Conversely, some H/RO decisions that have denied injunctive authority are similarly open to question. For example, a Pennsylvania review panel ruled that it lacked authority to order an extended school day. It is unclear, however, how to distinguish such relief from an extended school year, which is within the range of IDEA entitlements. Similarly, a Michigan hearing officer summarily ruled that she did not have authority to order accommodations on a college entrance examination; although she did not provide a direct rationale, her ruling is only supportable to the extent that the student’s graduation was bona fide. In a more marginal example, a Massachusetts hearing officer renounced authority to require a student to attend school after the student had reached the state-mandated maximum age, limiting the remedy to a declaration that the district offered the student FAPE and a strong recommendation that the student and the parent discontinue the student’s nonattendance.

Other open questions concern an H/RO’s authority to order a SEA to take action. The IDEA’s administering agency has opined that such authority depends on state law, but it added that authority may be implicated in certain circumstances by the SEA’s general supervisory authority under IDEA. Finally, the 2004 IDEA reauthorization directly addressed H/ROs’ injunctive authority in tandem with limiting H/ROs’ finding of denial of FAPE based on procedural violations. Specifically, after identifying the three limited situations for such a finding, the amended IDEA provides: “Nothing in this [limitation provision] shall be construed to preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local education agency to comply with procedural requirements . . . .” Thus, while limiting the

164. Others, however, appear to be not only pragmatically, but also legally sound. See, e.g., Marlin Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 285, 289 (Tex. SEA 1998) (disclaiming H/RO authority to discipline or terminate school personnel or to guarantee district employment for the parents); Ludington Area Sch., 20 IDELR 211, 212 (Mich. SEA 1993) (renouncing H/RO authority regarding the appointment of one aide over another qualified individual).


166. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.309 (2005). A possible distinction, which was not clearly discussed in the panel’s opinion, is whether the particular student met the applicable standard, which appears to be necessity rather than appropriateness. See, e.g., Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR ¶ 223, at 906 (Pa. SEA 2004).

167. Fenton Area Pub. Sch., 44 IDELR ¶ 293, at 1492 (Mid. SEA 2005). The IDEA regulations would appear to cover such accommodations under its IEP transition, if not testing provisions. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.347(a)(5), 300.347(b) (2005). Nevertheless, the hearing officer’s ultimate conclusion was that the child was not eligible, thus making her ruling merely dicta. 44 IDELR ¶ 293, at 1499.


H/RO’s decisionmaking authority, the amendments constitute the first time that the IDEA expressly recognizes the remedial authority of H/ROs.

III. OTHER RELIEF

A. Awarding Attorneys’ Fees

Although the IDEA expressly grants courts the authority to award attorneys’ fees, courts have construed the accompanying statutory silence as implying that H/ROs do not have concomitant authority. In the commentary accompanying the IDEA regulations, the administering agency has added a potential exception—in which state law so specifies. In the absence of such state law, H/ROs have consistently followed the judicial interpretation that attorneys’ fees are within the court’s exclusive domain. The 2004 IDEA amendment that provides for awards of attorneys’ fees to prevailing state or local education agencies in limited circumstances does so expressly within the same discretionary authority of courts.

Nevertheless, as an incidental intersection, an H/RO’s remedy may have an effect on whether a court determines that a parent is entitled to attorneys’ fees. For example, an H/RO recently upheld a district’s proposed placement of a child but concluded that the IEP was not sufficiently specific with regard to mainstreaming opportunities at said placement and ordered the IEP team to meet to revise the IEP. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the parent had only attained de minimis success and, thus, did not meet the prevailing party requirement for attorneys’ fees.


174. Although related, the determination of the prevailing party is a separate matter. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. Moreover, an H/RO’s issuance of a settlement order, akin to a consent decree, may have significant effect on prevailing status for attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2005).

175. See, e.g., Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 23 IDELR 287, 289 (Ariz. SEA 1995); San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 998, 1004 (Cal. SEA 1998); New Haven Bd. of Educ., 20 IDELR 42, 46 (Conn. SEA 1993); Sch. E. Chicago., 31 IDELR ¶ 45, at 174 (Ind. SEA 1998); In re Student with a Disability, 44 IDELR ¶ 115, at 584 (N.M. SEA 2005); Yankton Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 772, 774 (S.D. SEA 1994); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 670, 677 (Tex. SEA 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 843, 848 (Wash. SEA 1999) (finding the H/RO did not have authority to award attorneys’ fees).


177. Linda T. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist., 417 F.3d 704, 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2005).
under the IDEA. As another variation of this intersection, H/ROs may have the authority upon proper order to provide consent decree status to a settlement for purposes of attorneys’ fees.

B. Awarding Money Damages

Although a minority of courts have taken the view that money damages are available under the IDEA, it is generally accepted that this form of relief is not within H/ROs’ authority.

C. Making Strong Recommendations for District Action

A final category of marginal limitations is that H/ROs may only make strong recommendations that the defendant-district take certain action in the wake of an H/RO’s decision in the district’s favor. Given the appearance of forceful authority of H/ROs, such dicta is questionable from a purist point of view, though some courts have appeared to endorse this directive guidance.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of money damages and attorneys’ fees, H/ROs are generally not cognizant or consistent with regard to the boundaries of their remedial authority. The language of the IDEA and its regulations are not particularly helpful in this regard, but a growing body of published administrative and case law provides useful and enforceable demarcations that warrant careful consideration by H/ROs and other interested individuals. The addition of qualifications for H/ROs in the IDEA reauthorization—concerning H/ROs’ knowledge and ability to understand special education law, to conduct hearings, and to “render and write
decisions” appears to reinforce the need for H/ROs to be aware of and to act in conformance with the limits on their remedial powers. The codification of the applicable authority, including the boundaries for H/ROs, merits not only the attention of Congress—which has neglected this important area of policymaking as a foundation for state variation—but also customized elaboration in state special education statutes and regulations.

The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
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